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Abstract.  Scientists have the ability to influence policy in important ways through 
how they present their results.  Surprisingly, existing codes of scientific ethics have 
little to say about such choices.  I propose that we can arrive at a set of ethical 
guidelines to govern scientists’ presentation of information to policymakers by 
looking to bioethics: roughly, just as a clinician should aim to promote informed 
decision-making by patients, a scientist should aim to promote informed decision-
making by policymakers. Though this may sound like a natural proposal, I show it 
offers guidance that conflicts with standard scientific practices.  I conclude by 
considering one cost of the proposal:  that it would prevent scientists from acting as 
advocates in a way that is currently common in certain fields.  I accept that the 
proposal would restrict scientists’ political advocacy rights, but argue that the benefits 
of adopting it — promoting democratic governance — justify the restriction.
2
I.  A PUZZLE
The Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries and Risk Factors Study (GBD) is “the 
single largest and most detailed scientific effort ever conducted to quantify levels and 
trends in health.”   More than 2300 researchers from more than 130 countries collect 1
and analyze data on more than 300 diseases and injuries, aiming to put together a 
comprehensive picture of global health from 1990 to the present.   Not surprisingly, its 2
results are widely reported and discussed by scientists, policy-makers, and the public 
at large.  Probably the most high-profile of its results is its summary ranking of the 
world’s largest health problems, ranked by disability-adjusted life years (DALYs):   3
A striking thing about this list is the absence of cancer.  One might conclude from this 
that, perhaps contrary to our preconceptions, cancer is not a major global health 
problem.  That, however, would be the wrong lesson to draw.  Cancer is a major 
global health problem.  According to the GBD, it was responsible for 213.2 million 
DALYs in 2016 - far more than ischemic heart disease.  Why, then, is it missing from 
the list?  Because the GBD team chose to rank cancers separately by site.  Thus, lung 
cancer ranked 19th, liver cancer 32nd, stomach cancer 36th, and so forth.  Adding all 





1 Ischemic heart disease 174.6
2 Cerebrovascular disease 116.4
3 Low back & neck pain 91.8
4 Lower respiratory infections 86.6
5 Diarrheal diseases 74.4
6 Road injuries 71.4




 DALYs, a close relative of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), are a composite measure of 3
the morbidity and mortality attributable to a particular event or pathology.  The details of their 





9 Neonatal preterm birth compl. 62.0
10 HIV/AIDS 57.6
11 Skin diseases 57.4
12 Diabetes 57.2
13 Malaria 56.2
14 Congenital defects 50.4
15 Neonatal encephalopathy 47.0
Adapted from Hay et al. 2017
2016 GLOBAL HEALTH LOSS BY CAUSE, in  DALYs
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The choice by the GBD team to rank cancers separately might seem curious for 
two reasons.  First, a quick glance at the list appears to show an inconsistency. 
Although some items on the list represent pathologically unified categories (HIV/
AIDS, malaria, etc.), there are other categories which seem to lump together 
pathologically heterogenous items.  Why break up cancer into various subtypes, while 
having catch-all categories like “road injuries,” “sense organ diseases,” and “neonatal 
preterm birth complications”?  Second, the GBD team’s decision here is not based on 
any uniform disciplinary standard.  Many epidemiological studies do aggregate 
cancers.  The U.S. National Vital Statistics Report, for example, considers cancer to be 
a single category when ranking causes of death in the U.S. (Heron 2016, 5).  What 
could the GBD team say in order to explain their ranking, since it appears to be 
inconsistent and not grounded in a disciplinary standard?
Questions like this are important.  In deciding how to present their results, 
scientists are deciding what information readers will have access to, and what 
information will be functionally hidden from them.  More importantly, we know — 
from common sense, as well as a wealth of research by behavioral economists, 
psychologists, advertising firms, and political pollsters — that the manner in which 
information is presented can have a huge and predictable impact on how it is received 
and on what subsequent decisions are made.  The GBD team boasts that its data are 
used by governments, NGOs, and others in decision-making processes; and in 
particular singles out lists like the one above as being of great importance (Murray et 
al. 2012, 2198-99, 2201; cf. Murray 1996, 1-2).  The decision to disaggregate cancers 
likely affected the flow of millions or billions of dollars in global health funding.  
Questions like this are also not unusual.  There have been many recent episodes 
in which decisions by scientists about how to present results have generated 
controversy.  Climate science has seen high-profile debates about how to group 
countries for presentation in summary analyses (Victor et al. 2014; Dubash et al. 
2014; Edenhofer and Minx 2014), how to present uncertainty (Mastrandrea et al. 
2010), and (more generally) whether and how to “frame” climate research (Nisbet and 
Mooney 2007).  In a very public debate concerning a proposal to change how 
scientists report p-values, participants recognized that much of what was at issue was 
simply how results are described — yet that did not make the discussion any less 
heated (Benjamin et al. 2018; Resnick 2017). And mode of presentation is a core issue 
in debates about the choice of model parameters such as the economic discount rate, 
as well as whether to adjust (or “weight”) economic measures to reflect various social 
or ethical values — e.g., a preference for a more equal distribution of income or health 
(Schroeder 2019).
Choices about how to present scientific results can affect the progress of 
scientific fields, direct the flow of billions of dollars, and influence major policy 
decisions.  That clearly makes them ripe for ethical assessment.  They also raise 
distinctly political concerns connected to democratic governance, as political theorists, 
philosophers of science, and (especially) STS scholars have long noted.  Scientific 
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information and assessment is critical to nearly all major policy decisions, but policy-
makers often lack the expertise to independently evaluate the scientific information 
available to them.  This creates situations where legitimate decision-making authority 
and the information needed to make those decisions lie in two separate groups.  It is 
often impossible (given realistic constraints of time and resources) for scientists to 
fully communicate their knowledge to policy-makers.  And it is not clear whether 
decision-making authority can legitimately be delegated by policy-makers to 
scientists.  Thus, we have a situation where it is not clear how informed, democratic 
governance is possible.4
In this paper, I want to propose a framework that could be used to guide 
scientists in choosing among alternate ways to present their results to policy-makers, 
in a way that I believe does a better job than the status quo of promoting democratic 
ideals.  (I leave it open how broadly such a framework should apply, though I intend it 
to apply at least to scientific testimony to policy-making bodies, advisory committee 
reports, and other scientific publications, e.g. journal articles or white papers, with an 
explicit policy focus.)  I will begin by looking to existing codes of scientific ethics, 
showing that current standards leave scientists with uncomfortably wide latitude in 
deciding how to present their results (§II).  I will then offer my own proposal, 
suggesting we can take advantage of an analogy with the physician-patient 
relationship to construct a set of guidelines for scientists that are based off of existing 
bioethical principles of informed consent (§III).  The remainder of the paper will be 
dedicated to working with the analogy:  explaining why the principles it suggests are 
appealing ones for scientists (§IV), refining it through the use of existing work in 
bioethics and political theory (§V), and finally demonstrating both its utility and its 
revisionary nature through a series of brief case studies (§VI-VII). 
II.  A GAP IN SCIENTIFIC ETHICS
What norms or principles should guide a scientist in choosing among 
alternative ways to present her results to policy-makers?  The natural place to look for 
an answer to that question would be to existing codes of scientific ethics — those 
found in textbooks, those endorsed by professional societies, and those adopted by 
journal editors.  The relevant parts of such codes typically place a strict requirement of 
honesty at their center, sometimes supplemented with requirements of clarity.   This, 5
 For concerns of this sort, see Dewey (1927), Jasanoff (1990), Brown (2009), Kitcher (2011), 4
and many others.
 See the discussion in NAS-NAE-IOM (2017), the Singapore Statement on Research Integrity 5
(2010), and Bullock and Panicker’s (2003) survey of the ethics codes of scientific societies.  
For representative codes, see American Chemical Society (2015) and American Geophysical 
Union (2017).
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however, still leaves scientists with a huge amount of latitude.  In the GBD case, for 
example, it is true both that cancer causes more health loss than HIV, and that HIV 
causes more health loss than any specific type of cancer, so neither presentation raises 
any concerns connected to honesty.  And both of those claims can be presented in a 
perfectly clear manner.
Next, many codes include a requirement that information be presented in a way 
that conforms to disciplinary norms.  This, again, often isn’t helpful.  For one, 
disciplinary norms often permit the same information to be summarized in many 
different ways (as in the GBD case).  Second, the principles that govern the 
presentation of information should be able to, at least sometimes, tell us what norms 
should exist, so that we can criticize existing norms and propose new ones. 
Obviously, a principle that tells scientists to conform to existing norms can’t help with 
that.
Third, many codes include a set of requirements connected to openness: 
requiring scientists to be “transparent” and/or to present results “completely” or 
“fully”.  What this is supposed to mean isn’t entirely clear.  Some codes do specify 
that results must be described in sufficient detail to allow others to verify or replicate 
the study’s conclusions.   This, however, is a relatively weak form of transparency that 6
will leave scientists with considerable latitude.  (In the GBD case, it could be satisfied 
by simply stating what disease classification system was used.)  Many codes also call 
for scientists to make their raw data, source code, and unedited images available.  But, 
especially when it comes to interactions with policy-makers, this seems insufficient. 
Policy-makers typically don’t have the time or expertise to work with raw data or to 
dig through source code, so meaningful openness with policy-makers must involve 
sharing more accessible information — an explanation of scientists’ reasoning, 
references to alternative methods of analysis, discussions of other possible 
interpretations of the results, and so forth (Elliott forthcoming).  The problem, though, 
is that there are countless different respects or dimensions in which scientists could be 
transparent and therefore many alternative ways of achieving transparency (Elliott 
2020).  Without further specification — which existing codes of ethics don’t typically 
provide — scientists will be left with quite a bit of freedom to choose what 
information to share or highlight, and what to leave out or bury in an appendix.  If the 
GBD team, for example, were questioned about why they didn’t highlight the fact that 
cancer was a leading cause of global health loss, they could point out that all of the 
data was available online, and that the methods section of the paper did explicitly lay 
out the disease classification system they used and provided a sentence of explanation. 
Such a response wouldn’t, I think, demonstrate any failure to comply with existing 
requirements of openness or transparency or completeness, given the lack of 
specificity in those requirements.
 See e.g. American Chemical Society (2015).6
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Finally, some codes of ethics include a second hard-to-interpret requirement 
calling for objectivity, neutrality, impartiality, and/or lack of bias.  According to one 
understanding (which is probably the most common one among scientists, policy-
makers, and the public), scientific objectivity is characterized by a lack of values, or a 
perspective-independent “view from nowhere” (Reiss and Sprenger 2014).  Though 
that sort of objectivity may have a role to play in other aspects of scientific research, it 
is a non-starter when it comes to scientific communication.  In deciding how to 
present results, scientists must consider factors like importance, usefulness, and 
relevance — but those concepts are all defined relative to a set of values or goals. 
What is important, useful, or relevant depends on what matters or on what one is 
trying to achieve.  Philosophers, historians, and other scholars of science have 
identified a wide range of alternative conceptions of objectivity (Douglas 2004; 
Daston and Gallison 2007; Lloyd and Schweizer 2014; Reiss and Sprenger 2014). 
These conceptions, though, are not equivalent or reducible to one another.  If, then, 
requirements of objectivity are to be meaningful, they need to be spelled out, to clarify 
what sort of objectivity is being called for.  Unfortunately, existing codes of ethics 
don’t offer such elaboration.
The upshot of all this is that existing codes of scientific ethics have rather little 
to say about how scientists should choose among alternative presentations of their 
results, either in general or specifically when communicating with policy-makers.  7
Requirements of honesty, clarity, and conformity to disciplinary norms will rule out 
some options, but they leave scientists with many options to choose among.  This is 
where requirements of openness and objectivity could potentially step in.  But the lack 
of specificity in existing codes of ethics leaves it unclear how those requirements 
should be interpreted.  There are, of course, respects in which they do constrain 
scientists, for example striking presentation choices that would clearly count as biased 
or non-objective on many different accounts of objectivity.  But in many more cases 
 For further support of this claim, consider the influential 1992 report on “Responsible 7
Science” from the National Academies of Science and Engineering and the Institute of 
Medicine. Despite offering guidelines on several issues related to the presentation of research, 
it makes no mention of the issue discussed in this paper.  Indeed, it explicitly notes that 
“differences in opinions involving the interpretation of data” do not count as instances of 
scientific misconduct (NAS-NAE-IOM 1992, 5).  The 2017 update to that report does note that 
“misleading statistical analysis that falls short of falsification” does count as a “detrimental 
research practice” (2017, 74). But the report never explains what this means, and there is 
nothing clearly misleading about either way of presenting cancer statistics, for example.  The 
issue similarly receives no discussion in most books on scientific ethics.  (See e.g. Shamoo and 
Resnik 2015.)  And even codes of ethics that do explicitly comment on the public 
communication of scientific results don’t typically say anything about how information ought 
to be presented, beyond the requirements of honesty, clarity, openness, and objectivity already 
discussed.  See e.g. the Singapore Statement (2010), American Geophysical Union (2017), 
American Chemical Society (2015).
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their ambiguity will provide scientists with a great deal of latitude.  Scientists will be 
left with the freedom to choose among many different ways of presenting their results.
One reaction to this observation is to embrace it, saying that if scientists have 
satisfied basic requirements of honesty and clarity, and avoided clear and serious 
violations of openness or objectivity, they should be free to present information as 
they see fit.  Call this the laissez-faire model.  The laissez-faire model can be defended 
based on the idea that truth or good outcomes are best served by giving the strongest 
possible voice to each side in an argument — perhaps on the model of a court of law 
(Pielke, Jr. 2007, 11-16).  Or it can be defended by reference to the individual rights of 
scientists to free speech and political advocacy (Schroeder 2017).  Whatever the 
justification, the relative silence of current codes of scientific ethics on these points 
leaves the laissez-faire model as the status quo.  
Nevertheless, although some scientists have embraced something like this view 
(a point I’ll return to later), most appear to reject it.  The reason for this, I think, is that 
the laissez-faire model permits scientists to choose a particular mode of presentation 
because it is more likely to promote the values and goals that they (or their employers 
or funding sources) favor.  This type of strategizing generally seems inappropriate, in 
large part because it gives scientists a kind of influence over others that can be hard or 
even impossible for those others to detect.  Imagine, for example, that it was revealed 
that the GBD scientists had chosen to disaggregate cancers while aggregating road 
injuries because their friends worked in transportation safety, while their professional 
rivals were cancer researchers.  That would clearly seem wrong.  Such strategizing 
still seems inappropriate, I think, even when used in the service of unselfish goals. 
Suppose the GBD scientists had chosen to aggregate preterm birth complications 
because they regard the lack of attention to maternal and child health as a grave 
injustice, and so intentionally created a broad, heterogeneous category in order to 
draw attention to that issue.  It would be surprising, I think, to see scientists openly 
admit to doing that, which I take to be a sign that many consider it inappropriate.8
How, then, can we move beyond the laissez-faire model?  There are several 
possible paths.  One would be to expand disciplinary norms or conventions, so that 
conforming to those norms would seriously constrain scientists’ presentation choices.  9
A second would be to look at philosophical work on transparency and objectivity, to 
try to identify interpretations of those concepts that are well-suited to guide scientific 
 I think that this is essentially what some found concerning about the “climategate” emails: 8
the appearance that scientists were strategizing about how to present results in order to 
promote desired policy outcomes.
 For one attempt to create such standards, see the EQUATOR network (equator-network.org).9
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communication.   Perhaps existing codes of ethics could offer clearer guidance to 10
scientists, if they were supplemented by specific accounts of transparency and/or 
objectivity.  A third path would be to try to construct an independent systematic 
framework, by reflecting on the role scientists ought to play in the policy-making 
process.  I think all three of these paths are worth pursuing, and suspect that they will 
end up complementing one another.  In the remainder of this article, though, I want to 
explore a version of the third strategy.11
III.  A PROPOSAL: THE INFORMED DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
I suggest that we should model the ethical norms governing scientists’ 
communication with policy-makers on the ethical norms — already well-explored by 
bioethicists — governing clinicians’ communication with patients.  This idea is not 
entirely new.  Several scholars have mentioned it in passing (Martin and Schinzinger 
2010; Resnik 2001), and Kevin Elliott (2006; 2011) has discussed it at some length.  12
They frame the proposal as applying the “informed consent” standard to scientists. 
This is an unfortunate choice of terminology, since in most cases a scientist is not 
asking a policy-maker to consent to anything when providing her with information. 
So let us instead take these ethicists to suggest that, just as clinicians should aim to 
 This is a path suggested by Elliott (2020; forthcoming), and indeed some of his earlier work 10
provides an example of how this might be done (McKaughan and Elliott 2013; 2018).  
Transparency also plays an important role in the way many other philosophers propose 
handling value-laden aspects of science (e.g. Douglas 2009).  I am less optimistic that 
transparency will provide a general solution to concerns connected to the role of non-epistemic 
values in science (Schroeder 2019;  forthcoming).  See also John (2018).
 I save for another occasion a commentary on the relationship between my proposal and the 11
(relatively few) alternatives that have been put forward in the literature.  The more-developed 
existing accounts include Jasanoff (1990), Turner (2003), Pielke, Jr. (2007), Brown (2009), 
Fischer (2009), Kitcher (2011), and Edenhofer and Kowarsch (2015). Although the practical 
recommendations I offer will in certain contexts coincide with those offered by other scholars 
(especially Kitcher, Brown, and Edenhofer and Kowarsch), I arrive at those recommendations 
via a very different argumentative route — a route that I believe has the potential to yield a 
more extensive set of specific recommendations that can more readily be implemented without 
large-scale changes to social or political institutions.
 Judging from their repeated references to work on informed consent in bioethics, the idea 12
also seems to be implicit in Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer (2014) and John (2019). John’s 
proposed “value-apt ideal” has much in common with my proposal, though he grounds his 
conclusions in a general argument that respectful communication requires tailoring that 
communication to the audience’s values.  Unless this obligation is a very weak, prima facie 
one, John’s claim strikes me as too strong. In any case, it doesn’t explain why it is especially 
critical for scientists (and clinicians) to tailor their communication to their audience’s values — 
an obligation I don’t think applies nearly as strongly to most other professions.
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promote informed decision-making by patients, scientists should aim to promote 
informed decision-making by policy-makers.  Applying that to the case at hand, it 
would say, roughly, that scientists have a prima facie duty to present their results in 
whatever way will best promote informed decision-making among policy-makers. 
That is, scientists should present policy-makers with information in a manner that 
enables those policy-makers to make the decisions facing them in an informed way. 
Call this the informed decision-making framework.
I think that this proposal has a lot going for it.  But I also think that it hasn’t yet 
been adequately developed.  For one, arguments for it are lacking.  A detailed case 
hasn’t yet been made that the informed decision-making framework will yield a 
plausible and attractive set of ethical principles for scientists.  Second, the details 13
haven’t been worked out.  Although it is tempting to simply take the well worked out 
bioethical principles governing informed decision-making in the clinic and apply them 
to scientists, there are many differences between the cases.  Even if this analogy is 
useful, developing specific principles for scientists will require paying close attention 
to these differences.   Third, I don’t think that existing work convincingly shows that 14
this proposal can be used to provide concrete advice to scientists that goes beyond 
existing principles of scientific ethics.   Indeed, it may seem as if scientists already 15
endorse something like the informed decision-making framework, at least implicitly. 
As a result, I don’t think the case has yet been made that the informed decision-
making framework is actually useful.  These are the deficits I will aim to correct in the 
next three sections of this paper.
IV.  THREE CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF THE FRAMEWORK
A complete defense of any principle of professional ethics must depend on its 
real-world impact.  The real-world impact of adopting the informed decision-making 
framework is an empirical matter which can’t be settled until its details are worked 
out and it is put into practice.  In this section, therefore, rather than attempting to offer 
a conclusive argument, I will instead offer three considerations, each of which I 
believe suggests that the analogy between physicians in the clinic and scientists in the 
 Resnik (2001) supports the informed decision-making framework by appeal to a range of 13
factors but doesn’t describe them in much detail.  Elliott (2011) does offer a brief argument for 
it, but elsewhere I explain why I don’t find Elliott’s argument persuasive (Schroeder 2017a).
 This is a point noted by Elliott (2006), but he says that exploring it would go beyond the 14
scope of his paper.
 Thus far, Resnik (2001) has used it argue against paternalistic deception in the provision of 15
public health information, but such deception straightforwardly conflicts with the generally-
accepted requirement of honesty.  Elliott (2006) has applied it to a case — a commentary in 
Nature — that is exceptional in a number of respects.
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policy sphere is a helpful one.  Collectively, I hope they will suggest that the informed 
decision-making framework can provide appealing principles to govern scientists’ 
presentation of their results; and, accordingly, that it is worth the effort to explore, 
develop, and refine the view.
First, the informed decision-making framework coheres with many scientists’ 
understanding of their role when it comes to policy.  Michael McPhaden, then-
president of the American Geophysical Union, for example, said,  “To be a credible 
voice for the power of Earth and space science to inform policy, transform our 
understanding of the world, and inspire the next generation of scientists, we must 
build trust between the scientific community, the public and policy makers.”   The 16
mission statements of scientific organizations express similar ideas.  The American 
Institute of Biological Sciences says that it “works to ensure that the public, 
legislators, funders, and the community of biologists have access to and use 
information that will guide them in making informed decisions about matters that 
require biological knowledge.”17
Second, the informed decision-making framework provides a unifying 
explanation for the assorted requirements typically found in codes of scientific ethics. 
Honesty and clarity will tend to promote informed decision-making for obvious 
reasons.  Conformity to disciplinary norms will also usually do so, since having 
scientists in the same field using different methodologies can be confusing.  Other 
norms of scientific ethics, such as those requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
also support informed decision-making.  
What about the norms which we earlier saw to be vague and underspecified? 
The informed decision-making framework justifies those norms, while at the same 
time suggesting particular interpretations of them.  When it comes to ideas of 
openness, transparency, and completeness, the idea is relatively straightforward and 
unsurprising:  a presentation of results is suitably transparent and complete if it 
includes information presented in all of the ways that are likely to prove materially 
relevant to a policy-maker’s decision.  Of course, such a principle can’t be applied 
categorically, but must instead be balanced against other considerations.   The 18
informed decision-making framework, though, can suggest which ways of presenting 
information should be prioritized.
Next, consider objectivity and freedom from bias.  As physicians know, helping 
patients to make informed decisions requires getting to know them — understanding 
their values, specific informational needs, and so forth — and then tailoring 
information to fit those values and needs.  Similarly, a scientist seeking to promote 
informed decision-making should, ideally, tailor her presentation of information to 
 Quoted at https://ethics.agu.org (emphasis added)16
 https://www.aibs.org/about-aibs/ (emphasis added)17
 See Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer’s (2014) discussions of precision and audience 18
relevance, both of which include aspects of completeness.
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ensure that it is responsive to the specific values and needs of the policy-maker.  If, for 
example, policy-makers in some society are particularly concerned about gender 
equality, scientists there can best promote informed decision-making by 
disaggregating certain results by gender and calling attention to areas with great 
discrepancies.  
This focus on the values of the policy-maker (as opposed to the values of the 
scientist) means that two scientists with access to the same information (including the 
same information about the values of the policy-maker) preparing a presentation for 
the same policy-maker should present their results in roughly the same way.  In other 
words, according to the informed decision-making framework, the way information is 
presented should depend on the content of that information as well as features of the 
person to whom it is being presented, but not on any particular features of the 
scientist.  This matches a conception of scientific objectivity which has been discussed 
at length by historians and philosophers of science — what Reiss and Sprenger (2014) 
call “objectivity as freedom from personal biases”, Daston and Galison (2007) call 
“mechanical objectivity”, and Douglas (2004) calls “procedural objectivity”. 
Objective science, on this view, is science that isn’t influenced by the idiosyncrasies of 
individual researchers.   19
Thus, the informed decision-making framework can both unify existing 
principles of scientific ethics, and add precision and clarity to principles that currently 
lack them.  It can therefore potentially serve as an organizing principle for scientific 
ethics:  identifying appropriate lower-level principles, suggesting interpretations of 
those principles, and helping us to navigate any conflicts that might arise among them.
Finally I come to a third consideration in favor of the informed decision-
making framework.  The analogy between clinicians and patients on the one hand and 
scientists and policy-makers on the other, is rather deep, encompassing nearly all of 
the features which have been used to defend informed consent requirements in 
medicine.  In both cases, we have one party (the patient or policy-maker) who has the 
right to make a decision that calls for information possessed by another party (the 
doctor or scientist), where the second party is unable to fully convey her knowledge to 
the first party.  As a result, the first party is in a position of vulnerability and has no 
realistic alternative but to trust the second.  Given the many significant similarities 
between the cases, it seems reasonable to expect similar ethical standards to be 
 Boulicault (unpublished) labels this the “idiosyncrasy-free ideal” for science, in contrast to 19
the more familiar value-free ideal.  Boulicault and I discuss the idiosyncrasy-free ideal and 
compare different ways of implementing it in (Boulicault and Schroeder 2021).
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appropriate.   To the extent that we find the requirement of informed consent 20
compelling in the clinical setting, therefore, we should probably also find the informed 
decision-making framework appealing in the scientific setting — unless, of course, 
there is some special feature of the scientific case that renders it relevantly different. 
(I consider one potentially important difference in §VII.)
V.  REFINING THE ANALOGY
Though none of the three considerations discussed in the previous section is 
decisive, I think that collectively they show that the informed decision-making 
framework offers a plausible starting point for thinking about how scientists ought to 
choose among alternate ways to present their results to policy-makers.  To turn that 
general framework into a set of useful principles, however, requires much additional 
work.  I leave the details of that for another occasion, but in this section I will show 
how the process might proceed — and how it can be jump-started using the existing 
literature in bioethics and political theory.
What would it mean to take the bioethical requirement on physicians to 
promote informed decision-making and apply it to scientists?  In standard situations, 
physicians are told to tailor their presentation of information with the aim of helping 
patients to make decisions that reflect their own values.  So, for example, if a patient is 
wearing a “meat is murder” t-shirt, her physician should highlight that a medication 
contains gelatin.  But that same information probably need not be brought to the 
attention of a patient snacking on a ham sandwich.  That said, physicians are not 
directed to simply cater to whatever preferences or goals a patient happens to assert at 
a given moment; they are encouraged, when possible, to seek out and be guided by a 
patient’s considered, informed values (Groll 2011).  Suppose, for example, a patient 
says she doesn’t want a flu vaccine because the flu is no more serious than a cold.  Or 
she says she doesn’t need information about pain management following a major 
surgery, because pain doesn’t bother her.  Even if these patients are being sincere, 
physicians ought not simply accept the assertions and move on.  In the former case, a 
physician ought to attempt to correct the patient’s false empirical belief.  In the latter 
case, she ought to have a conversation with the patient, to be sure that she firmly 
means what she says — that this value isn’t simply a whim, likely to give way upon 
reflection.
 One apparent difference between the cases is the fiduciary role the physician often takes on 20
vis-a-vis the patient.  It is not clear, however, that that sort of relation is necessary to ground 
physicians’ obligations (Eyal 2011), and in any case many have argued that the support given 
to science by the public (via grants, but also via social recognition and esteem) grounds a 
similar obligation on behalf of scientists to work for the benefit of society (Shrader-Frechette 
1994, 25; Elliott 2006).
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Let us, then, apply these bioethical requirements to scientists as mechanically 
as possible.  Doing so yields a principle like this:
First Try.  In normal situations,  scientists have a prima facie duty to present 21
information to policy-makers in a way that promotes informed decision-
making.  This means presenting and highlighting information that is relevant 
and important in light of the considered and informed values and goals of the 
policy-maker.22
First Try isn’t a plausible principle to govern scientists’ communications with policy-
makers.  In some cases it fails to give scientists any clear guidance, while in other 
cases it gives guidance that is ethically suspect.  Let’s try to refine it.
Refinement #1:  Moving From Ethics to Politics23
The most obvious problem with First Try is that it doesn’t respect the distinctly 
political character of policy decisions.  Patients are typically making decisions that are 
theirs:  they have the right to (within certain limits) make whatever decision they like, 
and they aren’t obligated to justify that decision to others.  This is reflected in the 
bioethical requirement’s exclusive focus on the values of the patient.  Policy 
decisions, however, aren’t individualistic in the same sense.  Legislative bodies and 
 For now, I leave this undefined.  It is meant to rule out exceptional cases in which other 21
considerations override the importance of facilitating informed decision-making.  Examples 
might include emergencies (in which scientists don’t have time to present significant amounts 
of information), situations in which an adversarial relationship is explicitly sought or expected, 
and cases where a scientist explicitly announces she is acting as an advocate (e.g. when writing 
a commentary or editorial).  I also set aside the question of what a scientist should do when 
replying to a report clearly prepared as a work of advocacy.  The question of whether one 
should follow a set of norms being violated by one’s interlocutor requires more space than I 
can give it here.
 It is important to note the difference between this, and the claim, common in the literature on 22
evidence-based policy, that policy-makers are much more likely to act on scientific research 
that is tailored to the decisions they face (Rose et al. 2020). That literature is largely making 
the empirical claim that research tailored to policy is in fact more likely to get noticed and 
used.  I am proposing the normative claim that scientists ought to tailor the way they present 
their information. These are distinct claims, since there are plenty of situations where scientists 
might not want policy-makers to act on their research, or on specific findings they’ve reached. 
(This might be especially common in situations where a scientist’s values and goals differ from 
policy-makers’.) In addition, the notion of “tailoring” and “relevance” used in the evidence-
based policy literature is quite different from what I am proposing.  I thank an anonymous 
reviewer for encouraging me to clarify this point.
 For the general importance of this distinction and its relevance for work on the value-laden 23
aspects of science, see Schroeder (2020).
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regulatory committees often make decisions as groups.  In such cases, it is incumbent 
on each policy-maker to be able to explain her point of view to her co-decision-
makers and to make some effort to understand and respond to their points of view. 
Policy-makers must also understand things from the perspective of the public, both 
because they act on behalf of the public, and because the public has a right to provide 
input into policy decisions.  For all of these reasons, informed decision-making in a 
political context requires that a policy-maker have not just the information that speaks 
to her own values and goals, but also the information that speaks to the values and 
goals that motivate other policy-makers and the public.  
That, then, is the first respect in which First Try needs to be modified:  the 
reference to the values of the policy-maker needs to be broadened, so that information 
is presented and highlighted that is relevant and important according to the considered 
and informed values of other policy-makers and the public.  (For simplicity’s sake, I 
will assume that the values of policy-makers align with the values of the public.  What 
to do when that isn’t the case is a challenging question I will briefly comment on 
below.)
Without further qualification, though, this suggestion is too ambitious.  The 
GBD data set, for example, could be presented in countless ways.  In a large, 
pluralistic society, catering to the positions of every policy-maker and member of the 
public would require that GBD scientists present their results in thousands of different 
ways.  This would be impractical and counterproductive.  We need, therefore, a way to 
determine which (or whose) values scientists ought to prioritize when presenting their 
results — both when deciding what information to present, and in deciding which 
presentations to give pride of place (appearing, for example, in an abstract or 
executive summary, rather than being buried in the body of a long paper, in an online 
appendix, or accessible via a configurable data visualization tool).  When it is not 
feasible to tailor the presentation of information to all perspectives in a society, it 
seems reasonable, as a first approximation, to favor the values that are more 
commonly held among the public and policy-makers.   This will enable a larger 24
fraction of the public to meaningfully engage in debate and dialogue concerning the 
relevant policy decisions, and it will enable policy-makers to understand the 
perspectives and arguments of a larger group.  It does seem right to say that, all else 
equal, a policy-maker who understands the concerns of a wider range of her 
constituents makes a more informed decision.  Work in democratic theory highlighting 
problems with majoritarianism can help us to refine this initial idea.  An egalitarian 
foundation for democracy, for example, may justify giving extra weight to the values 
of those whose voices have been marginalized or excluded (Schroeder forthcoming).
 Several scholars have argued that when scientists face key value-laden decisions in their 24
research, they should defer to the public in something like this manner.  See e.g. Brown (2009); 
De Melo-Martín and Intemann (2018: 125-6); Douglas (2005); Intemann (2015); Lusk (2020); 
Schroeder (forthcoming).
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Refinement #2:  Handling Substantively Objectionable Values
The previous refinement was driven by a somewhat abstract concern that First 
Try failed to reflect the political nature of policy decisions.  There are many other 
cases where First Try is problematic for more concrete reasons, because it delivers 
guidance that seems suspect.  In such cases, it often isn’t hard to find parallel 
problems afflicting simplistic applications of an informed decision-making standard in 
bioethics.  This suggests a promising recipe for revising First Try by piggy-backing on 
the work of bioethicists:  for any case where First Try gives scientists intuitively 
questionable guidance, first construct a clinical case that as far as possible matches it. 
Second, ask how bioethicists have handled that clinical case.  Third, by reflecting on 
the similarities and differences between the scientific and clinical cases, see whether 
or how the clinical solution can be adapted to provide guidance to scientists.
Let me illustrate this method by considering a case where First Try offers 
unacceptable guidance.  Suppose an epidemiologist is presenting data to a group of 
policy-makers, a significant number of whom are racist.  The epidemiologist could 
present information in ways that would help those policy-makers make decisions that 
furthered their (racist) goals in an informed way.  He could, for example, partition 
geographical regions based on the racial makeup of populations, or prominently flag 
health conditions that are correlated with race. But it seems obvious that the 
epidemiologist should not cater to the policy-makers’ racist values in these ways, so 
there must be a problem with First Try.   Let’s ask, then, what would count as a 25
comparable case in the clinic.  We can easily imagine scenarios where a patient’s 
morally unacceptable goals — infecting a sexual partner with HIV, say — would be 
furthered by medical information a physician could provide.  This type of case has not 
received any attention in the bioethical literature, but a set of related cases has:  cases 
in which a patient requests a procedure (e.g., physician-assisted death) that a physician 
deems morally wrong.  The dominant approach to potential “conscientious refusals” 
says that when the requested procedure isn’t especially problematic, physicians must 
either perform it or assist the patient in finding another physician who will.  When the 
requested procedure crosses a certain line, however, physicians may refuse to assist in 
any way.  The tricky part, of course, comes in determining how to draw the line, a 
point on which bioethicists differ.  26
In the scientific case, a similar approach seems plausible.  Scientists should 
generally present information relevant to the values of policy-makers, even if they 
 Of course, there are plenty of situations where it would be perfectly appropriate and indeed 25
desirable for an epidemiologist to present data in ways that make race salient — for example, 
to help policy-makers identify racial disparities in health outcomes.  I mean to be considering a 
case where these redeeming features are not present.
 Proposals include appealing to the ethical views of the profession at large (Blustein 1993), a 26
substantive ethical standard (Davis 2004), or a legal standard (Brock 2008).
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disagree with those values.  But in especially egregious cases, scientists need not cater 
to the morally unacceptable values held by policy-makers.  The challenge, as in the 
clinical case, comes in determining what counts as an “egregious” case.  Fortunately, 
work in political philosophy suggests a way forward here.  If, as the informed 
decision-making framework suggests, we think of scientists as facilitating policy-
making when they communicate with policy-makers, then the problem they face here 
is connected to the more general issue of distinguishing substantive values that are 
legitimate bases for public decision-making, from those that are not.   Intuitively, for 27
example, if the majority values jazz more highly than opera, that would be a good 
reason for the government to subsidize a jazz festival rather than an opera festival.  An 
opera-loving economist who intentionally presented statistics in a way designed to 
make the opera festival look more appealing would be undermining a legitimate 
public goal.  But if the majority values the welfare of its white citizens more highly 
than the welfare of its black citizens, that would not justify the government in 
implementing racist policies.  A scientist who refused to assist in this pursuit would 
not be undermining any legitimate public interest, because racist interests are by their 
nature politically illegitimate.
Political philosophers and theorists have written a fair amount about which 
values are, due to their substance, illegitimate in the political sphere.  That literature 
can therefore be used to refine First Try.  I can’t go into the details of that work here, 
except to note that when it comes to the case of racist policy-makers, many different 
theorists have specifically picked out anti-egalitarian values as paradigm examples of 
values that are politically illegitimate.   This suggests that racist and sexist values 28
might be ones that we can provisionally mark as examples of values that scientists 
ought not cater to, even if held by the majority.
Further Refinements
I have suggested two refinements to First Try.  Putting them together yields:
Second Try.  In normal situations, scientists have a prima facie duty to 
present information to policy-makers in a way that promotes informed 
decision-making.  This means presenting and highlighting information that is 
relevant and important in light of the considered and informed values and 
 I consider here only values or goals that, due to their content, are politically unacceptable.  27
There are other reasons a policy-maker’s values might be politically unacceptable:  they might 
conflict with the values of the public; they may have been formed in unacceptable ways; etc.  A 
fully worked out version of the informed decision-making framework would need to consider 
each of these cases.
 See Nussbaum (2011, 29, 38); Rawls (2005, 243n32); Christiano (2008, 269); Gutmann and 28
Thompson (1996, 2-3, 73-79).  I discuss this issue in more detail in an unpublished manuscript, 
“The Limits of Democratizing Science: When Scientists Should Ignore the Public.”
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goals held by policy-makers and the public, so long as those values and goals 
are politically legitimate.  If it is not feasible to accommodate all views, 
preference should be given to the values and goals more commonly held.
As its name suggests, Second Try is not a final principle.  It needs much more 
refinement before it could serve as an adequate foundation from which to derive 
concrete guidelines for scientists.  It does not, for example, give clear direction in 
cases where the values of policy-makers diverge from the values of the public.  (Here, 
work in political theory on the nature of representation will be important.)  It does not 
give guidance in cases where there is no clear fact of the matter about what views 
people would hold if they were to carefully reflect on some issue.  (Here, both 
empirical and normative work on deliberative democracy may be relevant.)  It does 
not identify precisely which values are politically legitimate vs. illegitimate.  It does 
not offer guidance on how to handle situations where multiple policy-makers will be 
relying on the same information to make different decisions with different 
informational needs.   These, along with many additional issues, must be addressed 29
before Second Try can be turned into a satisfying and useful principle.  But I hope the 
discussion in this section has shown that there are promising ways of approaching this 
task, and that it can be expedited by making use of existing work in bioethics and 
political theory.
VI.  PUTTING IT TO USE:  FOUR CASE STUDIES
Whatever its abstract merits, the informed decision-making framework will 
only be of practical use if it can offer substantive guidance to scientists that goes 
beyond existing recommendations.  It is fair to be skeptical that it can.  As we saw 
earlier, many scientists and scientific organizations claim to endorse something like 
 I suspect that this type of case will pose serious challenges for any account of how scientists 29
ought to present information to policy-makers. After all, if different policy-makers are facing 
different decisions with different informational needs, how could any presentation of 
information be suitable for all of them?  The obvious and clearly most desirable solution would 
be to prepare separate reports for each group of policy-makers.  But in cases where, for 
whatever reason, that is impossible, the informed decision-making framework could 
potentially use democratic mechanisms like the ones mentioned earlier to decide whose 
informational needs to prioritize.  Even more complex would be a case where the way 
information is presented will influence how policy-makers frame problems and so what types 
of decisions they consider (e.g., one mode of presentation might lead policy-makers to 
perceive some problem as an economic issue, while a different presentation might lead them to 
perceive the same problem as an environmental issue).  I don’t know the best way to revise 
Second Try to account for such cases — though I note they have analogues in political contexts 
outside of science, which might provide a path to a solution.  I thank an anonymous referee for 
raising these issues.
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the informed decision-making framework, and so it is reasonable to wonder whether 
whatever guidance the framework could provide has already been built into standard 
professional practices and norms.  This, however, is not the case.  Although nuanced 
application of the informed decision-making framework will have to wait until a more 
refined version has been produced, even the crude version I presented in the previous 
section has bite.  In this section I will demonstrate that through four brief case studies. 
In each example, the informed decision-making framework offers advice that goes 
beyond standard codes of scientific ethics and conflicts with standard scientific 
practices.  This shows that, right or wrong, the informed decision-making framework 
represents a substantive and revisionary proposal.30
Case #1:  Absolute vs. Relative Risk
Risks can be and commonly are reported in either relative (“doubles the risk”) 
or absolute (“increases risk by 0.01”) terms.  Many scientists prefer to report risk in 
relative terms for a variety of reasons:  it can be easier to understand, may be more 
memorable, and may help in drawing attention to important issues.    Some 31
epidemiologists and ethicists, however, have expressed concerns about relative risk, 
questioning its relevance to decision-making.  If I tell you that some behavior doubles 
your risk of an adverse outcome, there isn’t much you can (rationally) do with that 
information.  It matters quite a lot whether it increases your risk from 0.2 to 0.4 — a 
huge change! — or from 0.0001 to 0.0002 — virtually nothing.  This result has been 
formalized by Sprenger and Stegenga (2017), who prove that given standard 
assumptions in decision theory, relative risk is typically irrelevant to rational decision-
making concerning treatment or policy options, while absolute risk differences are 
relevant.
There may be, then, a number of benefits to reporting risk in relative terms: 
doing so may make it more likely that audiences form true beliefs (e.g., because 
relative risks are easier to understand and more memorable), and may also lead to 
better outcomes (e.g., because it startles people into making decisions that are, in fact, 
good for them).  These virtues — educating the public and promoting good outcomes 
— seem like things that scientists should be seeking.  Indeed, it wouldn’t be surprising 
for scientists to announce those aims: “We presented risk in relative terms because 
research shows that such statistics are more readily picked up by the public, and we 
 To be clear, I am not claiming that the recommendations I offer here are novel. In the first 30
three case studies, the scientific practices I question have been challenged by other scholars 
(though the issues remain controversial).  The point is that the informed decision-making 
framework provides clear ground for questioning existing practices that are common and 
widely accepted - thus showing that existing scientific codes of ethics and professional 
practices have not internalized the informed decision-making framework.
 For a concrete example, see Skovlund et al. (2016), which reported that certain types of 31
hormonal birth control “doubled” the risk of depression in teens, and the popular response to it.
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think this is a critical issue the public needs to know about.”  But, according to the 
informed decision-making framework, those goals should be secondary to promoting 
informed decision-making.  If relative risk is not relevant to rational decision-making, 
then the informed decision-making framework will direct scientists to present risk in 
absolute terms.
Case #2:  IPCC, Sea Level Rise, and Radical Uncertainty
In a 2014 paper, Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer discuss a presentation 
problem faced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007.  I 
agree with their conclusion and the reasoning in support of it.  I want to discuss the 
case, though, because I think the informed decision-making framework plausibly lies 
behind their analysis, providing a unifying explanation for several of the principles 
they identify, and perhaps offering a simpler route to their conclusion.   
Here is the case.  IPCC scientists in Working Group I were attempting to 
estimate sea level in 2099 under a variety of different scenarios.  Of the factors that 
contribute to sea level rise, several were understood reasonably well: the thermal 
expansion of sea water, the melting of mountain glaciers, and the melting of ice sheets 
on Greenland and Antarctica.  But at the time, scientists had no models to predict a 
fourth factor:  the sliding of ice sheets in Greenland and Antarctica into the sea 
(“dynamical changes in ice flow”).  Accordingly, scientists chose to present their 
estimate of the combined impact of the first three factors, while noting that the fourth 
factor had been excluded from their assessment:
The problem with this choice, as Keohane, Lane, and Oppenheimer explain, is that the 
fourth factor could be huge — potentially more significant than the other three 
combined.  Nevertheless, it was “almost [inevitable]…that some policy-makers, out of 
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confusion or desperation, would use the numbers given” (346).  Thus, the choice by 
Working Group I to present their results in this way predictably led to “the inhibition 
of effective planning by coastal communities” (347) — in other words, to uninformed 
decision-making.  
Here is one way of seeing the problem.  The chart was presented in the 
“Summary for Policymakers,” thus identifying its intended audience.  For nearly all 
planning purposes — e.g., to build sea walls, or to determine how far inland to 
relocate population centers or infrastructure — policy-makers care about the total sea 
level rise; they have no independent interest in the source of the rise.   That means 32
that if in some scenario scientists believe there is a reasonable chance of no significant 
increase in ice flow, then the lower number presented in each range is potentially of 
policy interest, since it gives a lower bound on potential sea level rise.  But the upper 
end of each estimate is almost wholly irrelevant to policy-making.  The chart 
essentially says that in scenario B1, future sea level rise is “0.18-0.38m, plus a 
contribution from ice flow which could range from 0 to several meters.”  The 0.38m is 
of no use for policy-making.  Thus, the problem with the chart is that it presents 
information irrelevant for policy-making in a venue intended for policy-makers — 
precisely what the informed decision-making framework counsels against.
What, then, should the IPCC scientists have done?  I agree with Keohane, Lane, 
and Oppenheimer that the best route would have been to provide their best guesses 
concerning potential future ice flow, with an indication that these were subjective and 
highly uncertain.  But if, for whatever reason, that option was rejected, it would have 
been an improvement to remove the upper bound, replacing “0.18-0.38” with “at least 
0.18” or “more than 0.18”. This conflicts with the standard expectation that scientists 
presents results completely and precisely.  But, at least according to the informed 
decision-making framework, completeness and precision are not of independent value 
in communication with policy-makers; they are of value only insofar as they promote 
informed decision-making.  In this case, completeness and precision promote 
uninformed decision-making and therefore are not virtues.33
Case #3:  Distribution-Sensitivity in QALYs
 The audience is clearly crucial here:  many scientists have good reason to care about the 32
different sources of increase.  Of course, we can imagine the rare policy-maker who would 
care about the source — perhaps one considering geo-engineering proposals that could 
differentially affect different sources of sea level rise.  But I take it that such policy-makers are 
not a major audience of the IPCC Summary for Policymakers.
 For a similar view, according to which standard norms of scientific communication are 33
largely of instrumental value and therefore potentially subject to exceptions, see John (2018).
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There is widespread agreement that when it comes to health policy, distribution 
matters.   Our goal should not simply be to maximize total or average population 34
health; we should prefer a more equal distribution of health, even if that comes at 
some cost to the total or average.  For decades, health economists have discussed how 
economic measures, such as quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), could be adjusted to 
reflect egalitarian values.  To date, however, it remains vanishingly rare to see a major 
health economic study that incorporates a preference for equality into QALYs  — 35
despite the fact that such measures are commonly adjusted to reflect other ethical 
values (Schroeder 2017b).  Why?  As Temkin (1996), Sen (1973), and others have 
shown, inequality is complex.  There are many different senses in which a distribution 
can be more or less equal, and many of these senses are plausibly of moral 
importance.  Further, the intuitions which are typically taken to support egalitarianism 
can also support distinct views such as prioritarianism and sufficientarianism.  As a 
result, no single way of quantifying egalitarian values has gained general acceptance. 
Since economists have not known how to capture egalitarian values, they have 
refrained from doing so.
The informed decision-making framework, however, suggests that this has been 
a mistake.  Suppose you are a policy-maker who agrees that the distribution of health 
(and not merely its sum total) matters.  In accordance with the economic mainstream, 
you are presented with cost-effectiveness analyses of various programs which are 
distribution-insensitive.  How should you go about making your decision?  A natural 
thought — and the one implicitly recommended by many economic studies — is to 
begin with the cost-effectiveness data you are given, and then to adjust it to reflect 
your own egalitarian values.  Unfortunately, this usually can’t be done, at least by 
policy-makers.  To introduce distribution-sensitivity to a measure, one typically needs 
access to the disaggregated data, or at least to an estimate of what the disaggregated 
data would look like in the relevant respects (Arnesen and Kapiriri 2004).  In most 
cases, policy-makers are not in a position to do this.  That means that the egalitarian 
policy-maker given distribution-insensitive cost-effectiveness analyses is often faced 
with a choice:  make an informed policy decision that reflects distribution-insensitive 
values, or largely set aside the data and attempt to make a decision that reflects 
egalitarian values.
Suppose, then, that egalitarians of various stripes can agree that some particular 
way of quantitatively adjusting for inequality is better than distribution-neutrality.  If 36
 The discussion in this sub-section is largely drawn from Schroeder (2019).34
 The studies which do so are typically billed as investigations of inequality.  The only major, 35
general purpose study I know of whose results adjust for inequality is the WHO’s World 
Health Report 2000.
 Something like this task was undertaken by the World Health Organization’s Consultative 36
Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage, which settled on a (non-absolute) prioritarian 
approach (WHO 2014).
22
so, then given the consensus that the distribution of health matters, economists can 
better promote informed decision-making by presenting distribution-sensitive results 
alongside or instead of distribution-neutral results when reporting cost-effectiveness 
analyses and other policy-relevant measures.  As in the IPCC case above, ignorance 
(in this case about exactly what dimensions of inequality are relevant to health policy) 
should not prevent economists from attempting to quantify inequality.
Case #4:  GBD and Cancer Classification
Finally, let’s return to the case with which I began this paper.  The puzzle, 
recall, was that in the Global Burden of Disease Study’s ranking of the top global 
health problems, cancers were ranked separately by type, which consequently sent 
each cancer far down the list.  At the same time, other apparently heterogeneous 
conditions were lumped together into broad categories such as road injuries and 
neonatal preterm birth complications.  This sent each of those up the ranking list. 
Since a high placement on the ranking list increases visibility for a cause, bringing 
with it attendant global health funding, these choices matter.  So what should the GBD 
team have done?
Here is the only explanation that Murray and colleagues give describing the 
thought process behind their rankings:  
[W]e have also identified a ranking list with 176 causes selected to distinguish 
and cluster disorders that might have programmatic or public-health 
significance. We aggregated detailed causes within the broader categories of 
maternal disorders, diarrhoeal diseases, lower respiratory infections, stroke, 
and road injury for this reason.  (Murray et al. 2012, 2201)
This explanation fits well with the informed decision-making framework.  Although a 
category like “road injuries” is pathologically heterogeneous, there are policy 
measures (speed limits, mandatory safety equipment in motor vehicles, road repairs) 
which can prevent a wide range of road injuries.  The same is true for neonatal 
preterm birth complications and diarrheal diseases.  The current thinking on cancer, 
however, is that we are not likely to develop screening, prevention, or treatment 
programs for cancers as a whole, at least in the near future.  Instead, promising 
avenues of research and effective treatments target specific types of cancer.
If, then, there are many policy measures which can reduce the impact of road 
injuries, birth complications, and diarrheal diseases as a whole, then it is valuable for 
policy-makers to know the health loss attributable to those broadly-defined categories. 
It can inform their decisions about whether to improve road surfaces, hire skilled birth 
attendants, or increase funding for oral rehydration therapy.  But if there are no major 
screening or treatment initiatives that fight cancer generally, then knowing the health 
loss attributable to cancer as a whole does not promote informed decision-making, at 
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least for most important policy purposes.  Although cancers exhibit a kind of 
pathological homogeneity, they are largely heterogeneous from a policy perspective. 
When allocating funding for research, treatment, or screening programs, what policy-
makers need to know are the health losses attributable to specific types of cancer, 
since those are the things they can directly intervene on.  
Despite the fact, then, that policy-makers may have strategic reasons to prefer 
aggregated cancer statistics — aggregated statistics, for example, may be more 
striking and therefore helpful in securing funding for medical research or public 
support for health initiatives — the informed decision-making framework endorses 
presenting cancer statistics separately by site, as the GBD does, as opposed to 
grouping them together, as the U.S. National Vital Statistics Report does.  This, of 
course, does not mean the GBD’s approach is optimal.  Other presentations (perhaps 
one that grouped together all smoking-related cancers) could be even better.  To 
determine that, we’d need to gather information about policy-makers’ values and what 
policy options are available to them.  But it strikes me as significant that, even without 
collecting such data, the crude version of the informed decision-making framework 
presented here can at least tell scientists what not to do — in this case, ruling out the 
very common epidemiological practice of presenting cancers as a single category.
VII.  AN OBJECTION?
The last section presented four cases in which the informed decision-making 
framework yields recommendations which I find plausible, despite going beyond 
existing principles of scientific ethics and conflicting with standard scientific practices. 
But there is another type of scenario where the informed decision-making framework 
offers guidance that strikes me as much more controversial.   Although, as noted 37
earlier, many scientists think that their primary role in policy-making is to provide 
information, other scientists aim to use their research to effect change in society, 
including changes in society’s values.  Consider the following passage from a pair of 
conservation biologists:
Conservation biology is inescapably normative.  Advocacy for the 
preservation of biodiversity is part of the scientific practice of conservation 
biology. If...[the journal] Conservation Biology direct[s] the discipline toward 
an “objective, value-free” approach, then [it does] not educate and transform 
society... To pretend that the acquisition of “positive knowledge” alone will 
avert mass extinctions is misguided.  (Barry and Oelschlaeger 1996)
 Much of the material in this section is drawn from Schroeder (2017a), supplemented with 37
arguments from Schroeder (forthcoming).
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This kind of perspective — essentially an endorsement of the sort of advocacy 
permitted by the laissez-faire model discussed earlier — seems common in certain 
scientific fields.  I suspect, for example, that it is shared by many scientists researching 
economic inequality or sexual violence.  Such scientists often hope to present their 
results in ways that will promote the outcomes they favor — for example, to reduce 
economic inequality.  The informed decision-making framework, however, rejects 
such an aim, when presenting results to policy-makers who do not share those goals. 
Further, some scientists hope to use their results to change society’s values — for 
example, to convince people that certain types of behavior are very serious wrongs. 
The informed decision-making approach rejects this, as well.  So long as the values of 
policy-makers and the public lie within the range of politically legitimate values, the 
informed decision-making approach directs scientists to present results in a way that 
promotes informed decision-making in light of those values.  That could mean giving 
more weight or more extensive discussion to the economic benefits of a development 
project, compared to its ecological costs.  It may mean defining sexual assault in a 
more restrictive way than the scientist would prefer.  It may mean including luxury 
goods alongside basic necessities in an economic price index.  Is it really fair to ask 
these things of scientists, especially scientists who may have gone into their field in 
order to push back against such positions?
I agree that it seems unfair to place these demands on scientists, and that this 
signals a real concern.  The problem isn’t simply that this is a restriction on advocacy, 
since many occupations unproblematically include such restrictions.  (There is nothing 
troubling about Coca-Cola, for example, barring its salespeople from advocating for 
Pepsi products while on the job.)  The problem here is the particular type of advocacy 
that is being prevented.  The right to political advocacy is, appropriately, regarded as 
an especially important one, one we should be very hesitant to infringe upon. 
Nevertheless, I think that this is a cost of the informed decision-making framework 
that we should be willing to bear.  There are a range of situations in which we impose 
significant restrictions on the political advocacy rights of those in important social 
positions, including judges, military officers, and lawyers.  So it doesn’t seem in 
principle problematic to restrict scientists’ rights in this way if there is an important 
public good served by doing so.   38
 It is important to remember that the informed decision-making framework is meant only to 38
constrain scientists’ advocacy when speaking qua scientist.  And, as mentioned early in the 
paper, I leave it open how broadly the ethical norms discussed here ought to apply, beyond 
contexts where scientists are directly addressing policy-makers.  This means scientists will still 
have plenty of avenues to vocally advocate for their preferred positions — e.g. when 
participating in political rallies, writing newspaper op-eds, and perhaps more generally when 
they clarify that they are speaking as concerned citizens. The existence of these alternative 
avenues for expression goes some way to weakening the force of this concern, as an 
anonymous reviewer emphasized to me.
25
What, then, is that public good?  Adopting the informed decision-making 
framework can enhance the ability of the public to exercise its right of self-
governance in a meaningful way.  As we saw at the outset, the importance of science 
for policy-making raises a serious concern for democracy, because those with the 
authority to make certain decisions aren’t the people who have the knowledge needed 
to make those decisions.  In clinical settings, we solve the parallel problem by 
imposing a professional obligation on clinicians:  they are ethically bound to present 
information in a way tailored to the patient’s values and goals.  It is not a perfect 
solution, but it is a significant improvement over a baseline where clinicians are 
permitted to share information with an eye towards their own interests.  
The same is true when it comes to scientists and policy-makers.  In order to 
make decisions that effectively further the public’s goals and reflect the public’s 
values, policy-makers need the information relevant to achieving those pursuits.  If the 
public wants to minimize racial disparities in education, policy-makers need data 
presented in ways that foreground such differences — something that can be affected 
by the way populations are partitioned in data analyses, the start- and end-points of 
time series, the use of averages, and so forth.  If the public is particularly concerned 
about certain consequences of pollution, then those consequences need to be presented 
prominently and separately, and not lumped together with many other effects where 
they are likely to be overlooked.  The informed decision-making framework directs 
scientists to provide information in these ways — to choose statistical representations, 
significance tests, classification schemes, and so forth that provide policy-makers with 
the information they need to make informed decisions — thus putting the public in a 
position to effectively achieve its goals.  The laissez-faire model, by contrast, allows 
scientists to present results in ways that may fail to include, or at least obscure, 
information relevant to the public’s values and goals.  And, given the complex and 
technical nature of much scientific work, policy-makers and the public will often be 
unaware of what they are missing.
This, in turn, suggests a second, indirect benefit to adopting the informed 
decision-making framework:  adopting it has the potential to increase the trust that the 
public and policy-makers have (or at least should have) in scientists.  Under the 
laissez-faire model, scientists are permitted to present information in ways that further 
their own goals, or the goals of their funding sources.  Since the public and policy-
makers may not be in a position to detect this, a certain level of distrust towards 
scientists therefore seems warranted.  If, however, the informed decision-making 
framework were adopted and effectively enforced as a principle of scientific ethics, 
those grounds for suspicion would be lessened.
VIII.  CONCLUSION
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Scientists exert a significant influence over the policy-making process through 
the choices they make about how to present their results.  The GBD team likely 
steered millions of dollars away from cancer research and treatment and towards other 
causes.  The IPCC’s presentation of sea level rise probably led coastal communities to 
underestimate future sea level changes.  Health economists’ use of distribution-
insensitive calculations has led many egalitarian policy-makers to make policy 
choices that give little weight to reducing inequalities.  In none of these cases did 
scientists do anything dishonest.  There wasn’t any noticeable lack of clarity or 
transparency.  What they did was fully consistent with accepted disciplinary practices. 
In short, they didn’t violate existing standards of scientific ethics.  
Many scholars who have noted this seem to have simply accepted it, 
acknowledging scientists’ influence and recognizing them as a significant, unelected 
force in political decision-making.  Though such an analysis may accurately capture 
the status quo, I don’t think we need to resign ourselves to such an arrangement.  I 
have suggested that the informed decision-making approach offers a way of arriving 
at ethical principles that can guide scientists in making such choices.  By presenting 
results in a way designed to assist policy-makers in making informed decisions that 
reflect the policy-makers’ (and the public’s) values — and thus taking the scientist’s 
values out of the equation — scientists can promote important democratic ideals and 
also provide a foundation for public trust in science, one that does not pretend that 
science is a value-free pursuit.
Though the idea behind the informed decision-making approach is intuitive, I 
have argued that even in the relatively unrefined version presented here, adopting it 
would require significant changes in certain scientific practices.  It would require an 
even greater change to many scientists’ conception of their ethical responsibilities, 
since to be most effective the informed decision-making framework would need to be 
adopted and enforced by the scientific community as an important principle of 
scientific ethics.  But — and this is one of the virtues of the approach — it would not 
require any significant changes to the structure of government or society at large.  This 
is a standard that the scientific community can implement itself.  
Much work remains to be done to turn the general framework suggested here 
into a set of principles and guidelines that are of practical use.  In particular, it will 
often be challenging for scientists to determine what policy-makers and the public 
value  (though I think less challenging than some fear, especially if the task is taken 
up by large scientific societies, rather than individual research groups).  But the 
familiarity of the informed consent standard from clinical medicine, the ability to 
jump-start the project through existing work in bioethics and political theory, and the 
fact that even the crude framework suggested here can be used to criticize existing 
scientific practices, all suggest that this is a manageable task.
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